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Abstract
We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending
a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message.
While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this infor-
mation, but has to choose an action depending on the message he receives. The action then
yields to some utility for Sender and Receiver. We only make a few assumptions about the
utility functions of both players, so situations may arise where the Sender’s preferences are
such that she sends a message trying to convince the Receiver about a certain state of the
world, which is not the true one. In a finite setting we state conditions for full revelation,
i.e. when the Receiver always learns the truth. Furthermore we describe the player’s behav-
ior if only partial revelation is possible. For a continuous setting we show that additional
conditions have to hold and that these do not hold for "smooth" preferences and utility, e.g.
in the classic example of quadratic loss utilities.
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1 Introduction
In the early 1980s the first papers on communication games got published and nearly from the
beginning there have been two strains dealing with a different type of communication. Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982) introduced the cheap-talk models, in which the content of the message
can be whatever the Sender wants it to be. The Sender does not have to tell the truth and so
the Receiver either believes the message or not. Given this model the different types of the
Sender (corresponding to our different states of the world) may either send the same messages
or different types send different messages. While in the first case the Receiver cannot trust the
messages and there is a so called babbling equilibrium, in the second case the Receiver can get
information from the message.
While in this setting the Sender has no possibility to verify that she tells the truth, she can
only tell the truth in the models of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). In the models of
verifiable messages, each message consists of a set of states, which has to include the true
state. In equilibrium all different types of the Sender are separated, caused by the unraveling
argument. In our model we give the Sender the choice between sending a cheap-talk message
or a verified message. The limitation we do is to only allow for the entire truth as the verified
message, i.e. the Sender cannot choose a set of states, but can either tell the complete truth or
send a cheap-talk message.
In this paper we do not model communication in a very own way, but combine the most basic
settings of cheap-talk and verifiable messages. There is one player who has detailed information
about the state of the world. She is called the Sender, as she sends a message about the state
to the second player, the Receiver. In our model the Sender can choose between cheap-talk
messages corresponding to the different states of the world, or a costly verified message. The
Receiver reads this message and chooses an action, which yields to some payoff for both players.
While the verified message reveals the true state of the world, the cheap-talk messages do not.
The content of the cheap-talk messages can be the truth, can contain the truth, but also can be
a lie. The Receiver’s behavior after receiving a cheap-talk message may vary depending on the
preferences of both players. In a situation where there is no benefit for the Sender to lie, the
Receiver can trust the cheap-talk messages, while he should not do so if the Sender’s preference
differs too much from his own.
There are many economic and non-economic examples for Sender-Receiver-games: The
most classic is the idea of an employer (the Receiver) and an agent (the Sender) going back
to Spence (1973). The Sender has different interests than the Receiver, but still wants to be
employed or get a contract. Her effort cannot be observed, but she reports it to the Receiver.
Our model adds the possibility of costly reporting a certified effort, e.g. giving a proof of skill
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enhancement or other training. The Receiver has to choose an action according to the message
he gets. While the verifiable message gives him guaranty, the receiving of a cheap-talk mes-
sage also reveals further information, as the Sender has chosen not to invest into the verifiable
message.
Another example is the Lemon Market by Akerlof (1970). There is a seller (the Sender),
who knows the quality of the good she is selling and a buyer (the Receiver), who can decide to
buy the product or not. The cheap-talk message corresponds to the idea that the Sender simply
tells the quality of the good. We often see these messages in internet auctions or in online
car advertisements. On the other hand the Sender could also invest some money and certify
the quality of his product. In the real world there are several ways to do so, for example by
independent consultants and experts. Of course the Sender will never verify if the quality is low,
but for high quality it might be reasonable to assume that the Sender is willing to invest some
money into the verification to get his good sold.
Related Literature
Since the introduction of cheap-talk models, extensions in many different directions have been
made. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) introduce an additional Receiver. They observe how the
existence of a second Receiver changes the report of the Sender. McGee and Yang (2013)
and Ambrus and Lu (2014) do a similar step with multiple Senders. While McGee and Yang,
2013 focus on two Senders with complementary information, Ambrus and Lu (2014) model
several Senders who observe a noisy state. Noise is also added to the signaling game by Haan,
Offerman, and Sloof (2011). The authors derive equilibria depending on the level of noise and
confirm their results by an experiment. A different extension of cheap-talk is done by Blume and
Arnold (2004). They model learning in cheap-talk games and derive a learning rule depending
on common interest. The idea of Baliga and Morris (2002) is closer to our paper. The authors
give conditions for full communication, but also state conditions under which cheap-talk does
not change the equilibrium.
An overview over cheap-talk models and models with verifiable information can be found in
Sobel (2009). The author describes several models and gives some economic examples. Most
of these examples can be extended to fit our setting by adding a reasonable verifiable message.
At the same time other models focus more on disclosure of information and costly commu-
nication. Hagenbach, Koessler, and Perez-Richet (2014) analyse a game with a set of players,
where each player can tell the truth about his type or can masquerade as some other type. As in
the literature of verifiable messages, the player who deviates from telling the truth is punished
by the other players. If a player masquerades, the other players assume a worst case type and
punish him by choosing the action this type of player dislikes. The authors state conditions for
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full revelation depending on the possible masquerades of each player.
Bull and Watson (2007) and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2014) deal with communication
and mechanism design. While Bull and Watson (2007) focus on costless disclosure, Mookher-
jee and Tsumagari (2014) add communication costs to prevent full revelation of information.
Communication costs are also introduced by Hedlund (2015). The author derives two types
of equilibria: For high costs there exists a pooling equilibrium, while for not too high costs a
separating equilibrium exists.
Verrecchia (2001) provides an overview over different models of disclosure, which is ex-
tended by Dye (2001).
It remains to mention that there are several works in which the authors have created their own
way of modeling messages, which are most often in between the models of Crawford and Sobel
(1982) and Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). Kartik (2009) introduces a model, where the
Sender sends a message about her type, but has the incentive to make the Receiver believe that
her type is higher than it actually is. If the Sender lies in the message, she has to pay some costs
for lying, which depend on the distance between the true type and the type stated in the message.
Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) analyse the communication, where the Sender has to invest into
effort to make a message understandable, while the Receiver’s investment into effort is to under-
stand the message. They motivate this model by the idea that very confusing written messages
as well as reading messages without paying a lot of attention yield to misunderstandings. The
probability of understanding the message is influenced by the effort of both players.
Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) introduce the possibility for the Sender to send a costly mes-
sage with the same content as a costless message. By this way of burning money the Sender has
an additional possibility of signaling. The authors show that conditions exist under which both
message types are used. Verrecchia (1983) deals with the idea that the disclosure of information
works as a signal itself.
The most closely related to this paper is the work by Eso˝ and Galambos (2013). They start
with a similar idea, but make some different assumptions in their model. While they focus on
optimal actions for Sender and Receiver which are closely related to the paper of Crawford and
Sobel (1982), we start with fewer assumptions and allow for a wider class of utility functions.
Under their assumptions, Eso˝ and Galambos (2013) state conditions under which the equilibria
are split into different intervals depending on the Sender’s type.
The paper is structured as follows. We start by defining a discrete model in Section 2 and
focus on a finite set of states and actions. We state different conditions for full revelation.
Full revelation where the Sender just sends cheap-talk messages is only possible when the
preferences of both players are similar. Even if the preferences differ, there still can be full
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revelation: The Receiver threatens the Sender by answering cheap-talk with an action the Sender
dislikes. By this the Sender has an incentive to pay for the costly verifiable message. As some
actions are incredible threats, we define a set of possible threat points. We provide conditions
under which the Receiver can use an action from this set to enforce full revelation. Furthermore
we look at the cases of partial revelation and state all the different maximization problems. We
get similar conditions as we got for the fully revealing equilibria, but for partial revelation these
conditions just have to hold for some states. While the solving by hand might be complex, we
give some detailed ideas for algorithms. We simplify all these conditions for utility functions
that have increasing or decreasing differences.
In Section 3 we modify our setting to a continuous model. We provide necessary conditions
for the existence of fully revealing equilibria and also give some examples. We illustrate and
prove that in a fully revealing equilibrium the Sender will never use both types of messages,
if the utility functions of both players are continuous. A very detailed analysis is done for the
quadratic loss function. Since full revelation is impossible in a continuous state space, we give
conditions for full revelation in a discrete version. Extension possibilities are mentioned several
times within the paper, but discussed in detail in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Discrete Model
We start with a model with only a finite set of states of the world and a finite set of actions the
Receiver can choose from. Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωL} denote the set of the L different states of the
world, where each state ωi has the probability P[ωi].
The timing is as follows: The Sender learns the true state of the world and then she sends a
message to the Receiver. We assume that the set of possible cheap-talk messagesM corresponds
to the states of the world Ω and that verifiable message v is unique in each state of the world.
The Sender chooses a message from M ∪ {v}, so either sends a cheap-talk message or the
verifiable message v. There is no possibility for partial disclosure. While sending any cheap-
talk message is free, the Sender has to pay costs c > 0 if she sends the verifiable message. An
economic explanation for these costs can be either a payment for a certificate or the investment
into effort. For simplicity we assume that the costs are state independent, but state dependent
costs are discussed in a later part as an extension.
The Receiver reads the message and chooses an action from A = {a1, . . . aN}. By ∆(A) we
denote the set of mixed strategies. Both players have preferences about the actions, resulting in
different von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for both players, depending on the action
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and state of the world.
For the Sender it is given by u˜S : A×M ∪{v}×Ω→ R with u˜S(a,m, ω) = uS(a, ω) ∀m ∈
M , u˜S(a, v, ω) = uS(a, ω) − c and uS : A × Ω → R. So we can split the utility function of
the Sender up into two parts: First a utility function depending on action and state of the world.
Additionally we have to subtract the costs for the message if there are any.
For the Receiver the utility function is not depending on the type of the message, but just
on the action and state: uR : A × Ω → R. The utility functions show that there is neither
a punishment for lying nor a direct reward for telling the truth. We assume that these utility
functions are common knowledge. Let a∗R(ωi) denote the action the Receiver prefers in the
state ωi. We will make some more assumptions about this function later. We denote the Sender’s
behavior by the function f : Ω→M ∪{v}. This function f maps each state of the world to the
message she sends. We assume that the Sender does not mix different messages.
The Receiver chooses the action, depending on the message he received: g : M ∪Ω→ ∆(A).
In equilibria we have to define the behavior of the Sender for every state, so f(ω) and the
Receiver’s action after each message, i.e. g(m) ∀m ∈M and g(v).
The equilibrium concept we use is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Definition 1. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a dynamic game of incomplete information is
a strategy profile (f ∗, g∗) and a belief system µ∗ for the Receiver such that
• The strategy profile (f ∗, g∗) is sequentially rational.
• The belief system µ∗ is consistent whenever possible, given (f ∗, g∗).
In other words each equilibrium consists of optimal strategies for Sender and Receiver, which
are sequentially rational. Furthermore the Receiver has a belief system over the true state of the
world depending on the message he receives. This belief system is updated by Bayes rule
whenever possible. For Perfect Bayesian Equilibria the actions off the equilibrium path have to
be the best actions for the Receiver for at least one belief system. We can neglect this if we limit
our attention to actions that are undominated for the Receiver.
We are specially interested in equilibria with full revelation:
Definition 2. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is fully revealing, if the Receiver knows the true
state of the world, after reading the Sender’s message.
If there is full revelation, the Sender either sends different cheap-talk messages in each state,
or just verifiable messages, or different cheap-talk messages in some states and verifiable mes-
sages in the other states.
For the entire paper we make two assumptions:
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Assumption 1. Let us assume that for each action aj ∈ A there exists at least one belief system
µ such that aj is the Receiver’s best strategy under the belief system µ.
By ∆ˆ(A) ⊆ ∆(A) we denote the set of mixed strategies that satisfy this assumption, i.e.
∀aˆ ∈ ∆ˆ(A) : ∃µ : aˆ ∈ argmax
a
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω) · uR(a, ω)
Assumption 1 requires that each action is optimal for the Receiver at least under one belief
system, which means that there are no dominated actions. Our results depend on the idea that
the Receiver uses an action as a threat and so enforces the Sender to send verified messages.
The threat is only credible, if this action is an element of ∆ˆ(A).
We can think about different equilibrium refinements as introduced in several papers. The
most common ones are the Divinity Criterion by Banks and Sobel (1987) and the Intuitive
Criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987). Using any of them adds more conditions for the threat
points, so the set ∆ˆ(A) gets smaller and the Receiver has less possibilities to make a threat.
Assumption 2. Let us assume that in every state of the world the Receiver has strict preferences.
Under Assumption 2, a∗R(ωi) is a single action, which will help for the upcoming results.
This is to avoid the situation that the Receiver is indifferent between two actions.
2.1 Full revelation
In this first part we focus our attention on fully revealing equilibria. We will state conditions for
full revelation, where the Sender just uses the cheap-talk messages, conditions where she uses
only verified messages and conditions where she uses both types of message, depending on the
state. Even if conditions for one of these fully revealing equilibria are satisfied, there might be
other equilibria at the same time. By examples we show that the existence of these different
types of full revelation are independent of each other.
Assumption 3. Let us assume that for all states ωi 6= ωj the Receiver prefers different actions,
i.e. a∗R(ωi) 6= a
∗
R(ωj).
In other words the function a∗R : Ω→ A has to be injective.
This assumption assures that there can be a fully revealing equilibrium, even if the Sender
uses cheap-talk messages in several states. For the case that the Sender just uses the cheap-talk
messages and we still have full revelation, the Sender is not allowed to have any incentive to
deviate to another cheap-talk message. It is not necessary that the preferences in all states are
the same for Sender and Receiver. Crucial is that the action the Receiver chooses when he
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knows the true state a∗R(ωi) generates a higher utility for the Sender than the Receiver’s most
preferred action of any other state a∗R(ωj). There is also the possibility that there exists an action
the Sender prefers, but which is never included by the Receiver as long as he knows the true
state of the world.
Theorem 1 (Full Revelation just by Cheap-Talk Messages).
Let Assumption 3 hold. There is a fully revealing equilibrium with only costless messages sent
if and only if:
∀ωi ∈ Ω : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi) ∀ωj 6= ωi (1)
Remark. If Assumption 3 does not hold, i.e. if there exist two states ωi, ωj such that
a∗R(ωi) = a
∗
R(ωj), there is no fully revealing equilibrium. Still the Receiver can get the highest
possible utility in every state, while the Sender just sends cheap-talk messages.
Theorem 2 (Full Revelation just by Verifiable Messages).
There is a fully revealing equilibrium with only verifiable messages sent if and only if:
∃aˆ ∈ ∆ˆ(A) : 1) ∀ωi : aˆ 6= a
∗
R(ωi)
2) ∀ωi : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− c > uS(aˆ, ωi)
The idea behind Theorem 2 is that the Sender replies to cheap-talk messages with an action
aˆ the Sender really dislikes. With this threat point aˆ the Receiver forces the Sender to use the
verified message. The same idea can be found in several existing papers dealing with verifiable
messages, e.g. in Hagenbach, Koessler, and Perez-Richet (2014), which we already mentioned
in the introduction.
We can combine both theorems and get conditions for full revelation, where the Sender uses
both types of messages.
Theorem 3 (Full Revelation by Cheap-Talk and Verifiable Messages).
Let Assumption 3 hold. There is a fully revealing equilibrium with both message types used if
and only if there exists Ωˆ ( Ω with Ωˆ 6= ∅ such that
∃aˆ ∈ ∆ˆ(A) : 1) ∀ωi /∈ Ωˆ : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi) ∀ωj ∈ Ωˆ
2) ∀ωi ∈ Ωˆ : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi) ∀ωj ∈ Ωˆ, ωj 6= ωi
Theorem 3 allows that the Receiver trusts the Sender in some states (Ωˆ), but in the other states
he enforces the use of verifiable messages as in Theorem 2. To have both message types used
Ωˆ has to be a real subset of Ω and non-empty, otherwise just one message type is used. The
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two conditions in this theorem are quite similar to those of the previous theorems. Instead of a
single threat point aˆ, every a∗R(ωj) with ωj ∈ Ωˆ has to work as a threat. In addition the Sender
is not allowed to have an incentive to deviate to another cheap-talk message if the true state is
in Ωˆ.
There might be several possibilities for the set of states Ωˆ, where the Receiver trusts the
cheap-talk messages. Those possibilities do not have to be subsets of each other, but also can
be disjoint. For the case that there are several subsets we can say that for smaller sets Condition
1) has to hold for more states, but Condition 2) for less states.
Remarks.
• For the result of Theorem 3 we need Assumption 3 just for the states in Ωˆ. So even if there
exist two states ωi, ωj ∈ Ω/Ωˆ such that a
∗
R(ωi) = a
∗
R(ωj), Theorem 3 still holds.
• If Assumption 3 does not hold and there exist two states ωi, ωj ∈ Ωˆ such that
a∗R(ωi) = a
∗
R(ωj), Theorem 3 does not hold, but under the conditions of that theorem, the
Receiver still gets the highest possible utility in every state.
Theorems 1, 2 and 3 give conditions for different types of fully revealing equilibria. It can
happen that there is no fully revealing equilibrium just by cheap-talk or just by verifiable mes-
sages, but one by a combination of both message types:
Example 1. Assume that there are two states (ω1, ω2) and two actions (a1, a2).
The Receiver prefers a1 in ω1 and a2 in ω2, while the Sender always prefers a1. Obviously
there is no fully revealing equilibrium just with cheap-talk, because the Sender always wants
the action a1 and so she would lie. Furthermore there is no equilibrium just with verifiable
messages, because there is no threat available:
For the mixed strategy that plays a1 with probability p and a2 with probability (1 − p), we
use the notation pa1 + (1 − p)a2. Denote aˆ = pa1 + (1− p)a2. For p = 0, the Sender will not
use the verifiable message in ω2, because she gets the same action by sending cheap-talk, but
verifiable messages are costly. Also for p > 0 the Sender will not use the verifiable message in
ω2, because she prefers a1 over a2 and so she also prefers aˆ over a2.
Still there is full revelation possible if c is low enough. Let us assume that costs c are small,
i.e. c < uS(a1, ω1) − uS(a2, ω1). If the Receiver answers every cheap-talk message by a2, the
Sender will use the verifiable message in ω1, yielding to action a1. The utility the Sender gets is
uS(a1, ω1) − c > uS(a2, ω1), while her utility would be uS(a2, ω1) if she sends the cheap-talk
message. In the second state ω2, the Sender will use the cheap-talk message. Both message
types will result in action a2, so the Sender prefers the costless message.
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Even though we stated conditions for full revelation, it might happen that there is no revela-
tion at all. The easiest example can be done just by two states and two actions:
Example 2. Assume that the Receiver prefers a1 in ω1 and a2 in ω2 and the Sender’s preferences
are switched, i.e. she prefers a2 in ω1 and a1 in ω2. Clearly there is no full revelation just by
cheap-talk, because the Sender will always lie. Furthermore there can be no revelation just by
verifiable messages. Assume that the threat point is aˆ = pa1+(1−p)a2, with the notation used
as in the previous example.
For p = 0, the Sender will not use the verifiable message in ω1, because she prefers a2 over
a1. The same argument holds even for p > 0: Using the cheap-talk message resulting in aˆ gives
the Sender at least a little chance of a2. Therefore uS(aˆ, ω1) > uS(a1, ω1) and this implies
uS(aˆ, ω1) > uS(a1, ω1)− c.
So the only possibility is to have a fully revealing equilibrium with both message types used.
Doing the same steps again for Theorem 3 proves that there is no full revelation. So in this ex-
ample where the preferences of Sender and Receiver differ a lot, the Receiver has no possibility
to enforce the full revelation.
2.1.1 Increasing and Decreasing Differences
The previous results have to be checked for every state, which might be not easy to do. If the
utility function of the Sender satisfies either the increasing or decreasing differences property,
we can state weaker conditions. The idea is that we just need to check the previous conditions,
for one state and then can easily get full revelation for all states, if some additional properties
are satisfied.
Definition 3. We say uS(a, ω) has increasing (decreasing) differences in (a, ω), if
∀a′ ≥ a, ∀ω′ ≥ ω : uS(a
′, ω′)− uS(a, ω
′) ≥ (≤) uS(a
′, ω)− uS(a, ω).
Proposition 1 (Full revelation under increasing differences).
Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωL} and sort A such that A = {a
∗
R(ω1), . . . , a
∗
R(ωL)}. We can ignore all
actions, which are never the best reply for the Receiver in a single state.
There is a fully revealing equilibrium with aˆ = a∗R(ωj) if:
1) uS has increasing differences
2.1) uS(a
∗
R(ωj+1), ωj+1)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωj+1)
2.2) uS(a
∗
R(ωj−1), ωj−1)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωj−1)
3.1) ∀ωi > ωj : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi)
3.2) ∀ωi < ωj : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi+1), ωi)
10
The fully revealing equilibrium is such that the Sender sends cheap-talk in ωj and verifiable
messages in all other states.
Corollary 1.
We can replace Condition 3.1) by
3.1′) ∀ωi > ωj : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωj+1), ωi)
and Condition 3.2) by
3.2′) ∀ωi < ωj : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωj−1), ωi)
An interpretation of these properties can be done easily, if we look at the following Corollary.
Corollary 2.
Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωL} and sort A such that A = {a
∗
R(ω1), . . . , a
∗
R(ωL)}. We can ignore all
actions, which are never the best reply for the Receiver in a single state.
There is a fully revealing equilibrium with aˆ = a∗R(ω1) if:
1) uS has increasing differences
2) uS(a
∗
R(ω2), ω2)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ω1), ω2)
3) ∀ωi ∈ {ω2, . . . , ωL} : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi)
The fully revealing equilibrium is such that the Sender sends cheap-talk in ω1 and verifiable
messages in all other states.
The threat point here is a∗R(ω1). Condition 2) ensures that the Sender prefers the verifiable
message in the state after, which is ω2. Increasing Differences mean that the gains from a higher
action increase, if the state gets higher. With Condition 3) combined, we get that the Sender
also prefers the verifiable message in all states higher than ω2. We can get a similar result with
a∗R(ωL), where we have to replace ω2 in Condition 2) by ωL−1 and adjust Condition 3) as well.
An application can be found in Section 3.1.1.
Similar changes for decreasing differences can be made easily:
Proposition 2 (Full revelation under decreasing differences).
Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωL} and sort A such that A = {a
∗
R(ω1), . . . , a
∗
R(ωL)}. We can ignore all
actions, which are never the best reply for the Receiver in a single state.
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There is a fully revealing equilibrium with aˆ = a∗R(ωj) if:
1) uS has decreasing differences
2.1) uS(a
∗
R(ωL), ωL)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωL)
2.2) uS(a
∗
R(ω1), ω1)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ω1)
3.1) ∀ωi > ωj : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi+1), ωi)
3.2) ∀ωi < ωj : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi)
The fully revealing equilibrium is such that the Sender sends cheap-talk in ωj and verifiable
messages in all other states.
Changing the conditions as in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 is possible.
2.2 Maximization without full revelation
Whenever there is no full revelation, the Receiver cannot get the highest possible utility in all
states. Depending on the preferences, utility and costs, there might be partial revelation or no
revelation at all. We start our analysis by an example with just three states and give conditions
for partial revelation and no revelation. In a numerical example we will show that each of this
possibilities can be the best strategy for the Receiver.
In the second part we generalize: In a setting with more than three states, partial revelation
can be of one of three different types: Verifiable messages in some states, revealing the true
state. Unique cheap-talk messages can have the same effect, but cheap-talk messages can also
partial reveal information to the Receiver, such that it splits the state space into disjoint subsets.
In that case the Receiver might just know whether he is in the first or second state, or in the
third or fourth state.
We give conditions for all the different possibilities of partial revelation and also for com-
binations of those. Furthermore we again use utility functions with increasing or decreasing
differences to simplify these conditions.
2.2.1 Three state examples
Assume |Ω| = 3 and assume that the Receiver prefers different actions in different states.
In general the Receiver can maximize his utility by three different possibilities:
1. Use the same action in every state.
12
2. Reply with one action to one cheap-talk message and with another to the remaining mes-
sages.
3. Use the same action as a reply to any cheap-talk message, enforcing the Sender to send
the verifiable message in exactly one state, i.e. revelation of one state.
First possibility
max
aˆ
3∑
i=1
P[ωi]uR(aˆ, ωi)
s.t. ∀ωi : uS(aˆ, ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− c
Second possibility (Revelation in ω1 (wlog) by cheap-talk)
max
aˆ
P[ω1]uR(a
∗
R(ω1), ω1) +
3∑
i=2
P[ωi]uR(aˆ, ωi)
s.t. uS(a
∗
R(ω1), ω1) > uS(aˆ, ω1)
uS(aˆ, ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ω1), ωi) ∀ωi, i ∈ {2, 3}
Third possibility (Revelation in ω1 (wlog) by a verifiable message)
max
aˆ
P[ω1]uR(a
∗
R(ω1), ω1) +
3∑
i=2
P[ωi]uR(aˆ, ωi)
s.t. uS(a
∗
R(ω1), ω1)− c > uS(aˆ, ω1)
uS(aˆ, ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− c ∀ωi, i ∈ {2, 3}
These are the different maximization problems the Receiver has to solve to find the best strategy.
With different example we will show that either of the strategies can be the best choice. For that
we have to keep in mind that the Receiver cannot commit to any strategies, but plays his best
possibility given his beliefs. Especially in the case where he knows the true state, the Receiver
will always play the action that yields the highest utility for him.
Example 3. Assume c > 2, |Ω| = |A| = 3,
uR(a3, ω1) = 4 uR(a1, ω1) = 2 uR(a2, ω1) = 1
uR(a1, ω2) = 4 uR(a2, ω2) = 2 uR(a3, ω2) = 1
uR(a2, ω3) = 4 uR(a1, ω3) = 2 uR(a3, ω3) = 1
and uS(·, ω1) = uR(·, ω1), but uS(·, ω2) = uR(·, ω3) and uS(·, ω3) = uR(·, ω2). So Sender and
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Receiver have the same preferences in ω1, but switched between ω2 and ω3.
No full revelation
Clearly there is no full revelation just by cheap-talk messages. The proof why there is no
full revelation just by verifiable messages and also not by both message types used, follows the
same idea: Assume that aˆ = π1a1 + π2a2 + (1− π1 − π2)a3, therefore
uS(a3, ω1)− c > uS(aˆ, ω1)
uS(a1, ω2)− c > uS(aˆ, ω2)
uS(a2, ω3)− c > uS(aˆ, ω3)
have to hold. Rewriting this yields to
4− c > π1 · 1 + π2 · 2 + (1− π1 − π2) · 4
2− c > π1 · 2 + π2 · 4 + (1− π1 − π2) · 1
2− c > π1 · 4 + π2 · 2 + (1− π1 − π2) · 1
and finally to
c < 3π1 + 2π2
1− c > π1 + 3π2
1− c > 3π1 + π2
This is impossible for c ≥ 1. For the full revelation by both message types, aˆ can also be equal
to a1, a2 or a3, but all these possibilities still contradict at least one condition.
Maximization
1.) No revelation:
The Receiver solvesmax 1
3
· (2π1 +1π1+4(1− π1− π2)) +
1
3
· (4π1+2π1+1(1− π1− π2)) +
1
3
· (2π1 + 4π1 + 1(1 − π1 − π2)), which yields to aˆ = a1 and expected utility for the Receiver
given by E[uR] =
1
3
(2 + 4 + 2) = 8
3
. The conditions for the Sender not to deviate are:
uS(aˆ, ω1) > uS(a3, ω1) ⇔ 2 > 4− c
uS(aˆ, ω2) > uS(a1, ω1) ⇔ 2 > 4− c
uS(aˆ, ω3) > uS(a2, ω1) ⇔ 4 > 2− c.
All these conditions hold for c > 2.
2.) Partial revelation of ω1 by cheap-talk:
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The Receiver has to answer with a3 to one cheap-talk message and with aˆ to the others. The
maximization problem yields that aˆ = π1a1 + (1 − π1)a2, with π1 ∈ [0, 1]. The conditions for
the Sender’s utility are
uS(a3, ω1) > uS(aˆ, ω1) ⇔ 4 > uS(aˆ, ω1)
uS(aˆ, ω2) > uS(a3, ω1) ⇔ uS(aˆ, ω2) > 1
uS(aˆ, ω3) > uS(a3, ω1) ⇔ uS(aˆ, ω3) > 1,
which are clearly satisfied. Here the Receiver’s expected utility is E[uR] =
1
3
(4 + 6) = 10
3
.
3.) Partial revelation of ω1 by a verifiable message:
For example we can take aˆ = a2. The conditions for the Sender’s utility are
uS(a3, ω1)− c > uS(a2, ω1) ⇔ 4− c > 1
uS(a2, ω2) > uS(a1, ω1)− c ⇔ 4 > 2− c
uS(a2, ω3) > uS(a2, ω1)− c ⇔ 2 > 2− c,
which all hold for c < 3. The Receiver’s expected utility is E[uR] =
1
3
(4 + 6) = 10
3
.
In this example it is possible to get partial revelation inω1 either by cheap-talk or by verifiable
message if c ∈ (2, 3). For c > 3 partial revelation is just possible by cheap-talk.
Example 4. Assume c > 2, |Ω| = |A| = 3,
uR(a3, ω1) = 4 uR(a1, ω1) = 2 uR(a2, ω1) = 1
uR(a1, ω2) = 4 uR(a2, ω2) = 2 uR(a3, ω2) = 1
uR(a2, ω3) = 4 uR(a1, ω3) = 2 uR(a3, ω3) = 1
and
uS(a3, ω1) = 4 uR(a1, ω1) = 2 uR(a2, ω1) = 1
uS(a3, ω2) = 4 uR(a2, ω2) = 2 uR(a1, ω2) = 1
uS(a3, ω3) = 4 uR(a1, ω3) = 2 uR(a2, ω3) = 1.
No full revelation
Obviously there is no fully revealing equilibrium just by cheap-talk message, because Sender
and Receiver prefer different actions in two states. To see that full revelation just by verifiable
messages is impossible, we take a closer look at ω2: To have an incentive to send the verifiable
information the Sender has to prefer us(a1, ω2)−c over uS(aˆ, ω2). Since the left part equals 1−c
and the right part something larger than 1, this is impossible. The same arguments contradict
the full revelation by both message types for mixed strategies.
For aˆ = a1, the Sender does not use the verifiable message in ω3 and for aˆ = a2 she uses
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cheap-talk in ω2. So there is no full revelation possible.
Maximization
1.) No revelation:
The maximization here is the same as in the previous example. It is possible for c > 2 and the
expected utility is E[uR] =
8
3
.
2.) Partial revelation by cheap-talk
Getting partial revelation in ω1 is impossible, because the Sender will use the same cheap-talk
message in both other states. To get partial revelation in ω2, uS(a1, ω2) > uS(aˆ, ω2) has to hold,
which is impossible for any aˆ 6= a1. Same arguments work with a2 in ω3. This means in this
example it is not possible to achieve partial revelation by different answers to cheap-talk.
3.) Partial revelation of ω1 by a verifiable message:
For example we can take aˆ = a2. The conditions for the Sender’s utility are
uR(a3, ω1)− c > uS(a2, ω1) ⇔ 4− c > 1
uR(a2, ω2) > uS(a1, ω1)− c ⇔ 2 > 1− c
uR(a2, ω3) > uS(a2, ω1)− c ⇔ 1 > 1− c,
which again all hold for c < 3. The Receiver’s expected utility is E[uR] =
1
3
(4 + 6) = 10
3
.
In this example partial revelation is only possible by verifiable information and just if
c ∈ (2, 3) holds. For c > 3 partial revelation is impossible and the Receiver maximizes his
utility as he would do without communication.
2.2.2 General results
Again we would like to underline that the Receiver cannot commit to any actions, but maximizes
his utility. Then it should be obvious that the Receiver always prefers partial revelation over no
revelation at all. If there is a partial revelation of one state, the Receiver will maximize his
expected utility in the remaining states. It might happen that several actions (pure or mixed)
solve this maximization problem.
Definition 4. For Ω′ ⊆ Ω we define A˙(Ω′) = argmax
a
∑
ω∈Ω′
µ[ω]uR(a, ω).
A˙(Ω′) is the set of actions which maximize the Receiver’s utility on a given state space Ω′
according to the Receiver’s belief system µ.
In a general model with more than three states, there can be different types of partial revela-
tion: Partial revelation can be either achieved by verifiable messages, which then fully reveal a
subset of states or by cheap-talk messages. Partial revelation by cheap-talk creates a partition of
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state subsets, each element of the partition can contain a single state or several states. Elements
with just a single state have the same effect as verifiable messages: The Receiver knows whether
specific state is the true state. For simplicity we split partial revelation by cheap-talk up into
two cases.
1 Partial revelation by verifiable messages⇒ Full Revelation of a subset of states
2 A Partial revelation by cheap-talk⇒ Full Revelation of a subset of states
B Partial revelation by cheap-talk⇒ Dividing the state space into disjoint subsets.
The case 2A contains just the special cases, in which the partition consists of some subsets with
just one element and a subset containing the remaining states. Note that also in case 2 there can
be a full revelation of subsets of states.
In a world with four states {ω1, . . . ω4} partial revelation by type 2B for example means that
the Receiver just knows whether the true state is in {ω1, ω2} or in {ω3, ω4}. Of course there can
also be a combination of type 1 with 2A or with 2B.
Even with just 4 states most often it is impossible to see, which partial revelation is possible
without calculating all possibilities. We state conditions for each of the different types and their
combinations. With these conditions it is easy to write an algorithm and let a computer check
all the possibilities.
Partial Revelation just by one message type
Proposition 3 (Partial Revelation just by Verifiable Messages).
There is a partial revealing equilibrium, where the Sender uses verifiable messages to reveal
the true state just in the states in ΩvI ( Ω if
∃aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ ΩvI) : 1) ∀ω ∈ ΩvI : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c > uS(aˆ, ω)
2) ∀ω ∈ Ω \ ΩvI : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c < uS(aˆ, ω).
With this theorem we can define the family of subsets in which partial revelation by verifiable
information is possible.
Definition 5.
ΩvI(Ω) =
{
ΩvI ( Ω
∣∣∣ ∃aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ ΩvI) such that
∀ω ∈ ΩvI : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c > uS(aˆ, ω) and
∀ω ∈ Ω \ ΩvI : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c < uS(aˆ, ω)
}
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This implies that partial revelation by verifiable information is impossible if ΩvI(Ω) = {∅}.
We can also define the set of all tuples of actions and subsets of states (aˆ,ΩvI), where the action
maximizes the Receiver’s utility on Ω\ΩvI , but for the states in ΩvI this action works as a threat
to enforce the Sender to use the verifiable message.
Definition 6.
ΩvIA (Ω) =
{(
aˆ,ΩvI
) ∣∣∣ 1) aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ ΩvI)
2) ∀ω ∈ ΩvI : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c > uS(aˆ, ω)
3) ∀ω ∈ Ω \ ΩvI : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c < uS(aˆ, ω)
}
This definition will help to combine different types of partial revelation. We can make similar
statements for partial revelation of type 2A:
Proposition 4 (Partial Revelation just by Cheap-Talk).
There is a partial revealing equilibrium, where the Sender uses verifiable messages to reveal
the true state just in all states in Ωct ( Ω if
∃aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ Ωct) : 1) ∀ω ∈ Ωct : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) > uS(aˆ, ω)
2) ∀ω ∈ Ω \ Ωct : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) < uS(aˆ, ω).
Definition 7.
Ωct(Ω) =
{
Ωct ( Ω
∣∣∣ ∃aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ Ωct) such that
∀ω ∈ Ωct : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) > uS(aˆ, ω) and
∀ω ∈ Ω \ Ωct : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) < uS(aˆ, ω)
}
Definition 8.
ΩctA(Ω) =
{(
aˆ,Ωct
) ∣∣∣ 1) aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ Ωct)
2) ∀ω ∈ Ωct : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) > uS(aˆ, ω)
3) ∀ω ∈ Ω \ Ωct : uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) < uS(aˆ, ω)
}
For partial revelation of type 2B the conditions look a little bit different.
Proposition 5 (Partial Revelation just by Cheap-Talk).
There is a partial revealing equilibrium, where the state space Ω is split up into disjoint subsets
if there exists a series of sets (Ωdivj )j=1,...,J such that
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1.
J⋃
j=1
Ωdivj = Ω and ∀k 6= l : Ω
div
k ∩ Ω
div
l = ∅.
2. ∀Ωdivj ∃aˆj ∈ A˙(Ω
div
j ) such that uS(aˆk, ω) > uS(aˆl, ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω
div
k with k 6= l.
The first condition says that the subsets have to be disjoint and add up to the complete state
space. The second condition ensures that the Sender has no incentive to lie if the Receiver
chooses the actions that maximize his expected utility for each subset. As before, we can write
this as a set, this time consisting of series of tuples of actions and subsets of the state space:
Definition 9.
ΩdivA (Ω) =
{(
aˆj ,Ω
div
j
)
j
∣∣∣ 1) ∀Ωdivk : ak ∈ A˙(Ωdivk )
2)
⋃
j
Ωdivj = Ω and ∀k 6= l : Ω
div
k ∩ Ω
div
l = ∅
3) ∀ω ∈ Ωdivk : ∀aˆk 6= aˆl : uS(aˆk, ω) > uS(aˆl, ω)
}
This set contains all the different possibilities of series of tuples that split the state space into
subsets.
Partial revelation by a combination of verifiable messages and cheap-talk
For the combination of two types of partial revelation it is not sufficient to combine ΩvI and
Ωct, because we need to use the same action aˆ for the states, that are not revealed.
Theorem 4 (Partial Revelation by type 1 and 2A).
All combinations of revelation by verifiable message and cheap-talk (type 2A) are given by:
ΩvI+ct(Ω) =
{(
ΩvI ,Ωct
) ∣∣∣ 1) ΩvI ∩ Ωct = ∅
2) ∃aˆ ∈ A˙
(
Ω \ (ΩvI ∪ Ωct)
)
such that
(aˆ,ΩvI) ∈ ΩvIA (Ω \ Ω
ct) and
(aˆ,Ωct) ∈ ΩctA(Ω \ Ω
vI)
}
This means that all states in ΩvI are revealed by verifiable messages and those in Ωct by
cheap-talk. Therefore it is necessary that aˆ maximizes the Receiver’s utility for the remaining
states Ω \ (ΩvI ∪ Ωct). By the definition of ΩvI and Ωct it is ensured that ΩvI ∪ Ωct ( Ω holds,
because otherwise there would be full revelation.
Similar to the combination of type 1 and type 2A, it is also possible to combine type 1 and
type 2B. This means that there are some states revealed by verifiable information (type 1) and
the remaining states are divided into subsets of the state space (type 2B).
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Theorem 5 (Partial Revelation by type 1 and 2B).
All combinations of revelation by verifiable message and cheap-talk (type 2B) are given by:
ΩvI+div(Ω) =
{((
aˆj ,Ω
div
j
)
j
,ΩvI
) ∣∣∣ 1)
(⋃
j
Ωdivj
)
∪ ΩvI = Ω
2) ∀Ωdivk : Ω
div
k ∩ Ω
vI = ∅
3) (aˆj ,Ω
div
j )j ∈ Ω
div
A (Ω \ Ω
vI)
4) ∀aˆk : (aˆk,Ω
vI) ∈ ΩvIA
(
Ω \
(⋃
l 6=k
Ωdivl
)) }
Condition 1) and 2) ensure that the subsets of states are disjoint, but united are equal to the
entire state space. Condition 3) makes sure that the states are split up, if there is no revelation
by a verifiable message. The Receiver plays different actions on different subsets of states, with
Condition 4) the Sender will send the verifiable message in all states in ΩvI and will not deviate
to an action aˆk from the series (aˆj).
2.2.3 Increasing and Decreasing Differences
For increasing (or decreasing) differences, we can state the existence of partial revealing equilib-
ria with verifiable messages in a way similar to Proposition 1. The most important change is that
the answer to cheap-talk is no longer a∗R, but aˆ such that this action maximizes the Receiver’s
utility on the non-revealed states.
Proposition 6 (Partial Revelation by verifiable messages under increasing differences).
Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωL} and sort A such that A = {a
∗
R(ω1), . . . , a
∗
R(ωL)}. We can ignore all
actions, which are never the best reply for the Receiver in a single state.
There is a partial revealing equilibrium that reveals the states just in [ω, ω] by verifiable mes-
sages if
∃aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ [ω, ω]) with a∗R(ω) > aˆ such that
1) uS has increasing differences on Ω
′ = [ω, ω] and A′ = [a∗R(ω), a
∗
R(ω)]
2) uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c > uS(aˆ, ω)
3) ∀ωi ∈ [ω, ω] : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi)
4) ∀ωj ∈ Ω \ [ω, ω] : uS(aˆ, ωj) > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωj)− c
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Proposition 7 (Partial Revelation by verifiable messages under increasing differences).
Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωL} and sort A such that A = {a
∗
R(ω1), . . . , a
∗
R(ωL)}. We can ignore all
actions, which are never the best reply for the Receiver in a single state.
There is a partial revealing equilibrium that reveals the states just in [ω, ω] by verifiable mes-
sages if
∃aˆ ∈ A˙(Ω \ [ω, ω]) with a∗R(ω) < aˆ such that
1) uS has increasing differences on Ω
′ = [ω, ω] and A′ = [a∗R(ω), a
∗
R(ω)]
2) uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω)− c > uS(aˆ, ω)
3) ∀ωi ∈ [ω, ω] : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) ≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi+1), ωi)
4) ∀ωj ∈ Ω \ [ω, ω] : uS(aˆ, ωj) > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωj)− c
We can do a similar change to Condition 3) as before and also get the same results for de-
creasing differences by the same changes as done between Propositions 1 and 2.
In addition it is possible to rewrite these conditions that they hold for more than just a single
interval [ω, ω], but for a disjoint series of intervals
(
[ωk, ωk]
)
k
.
3 Continuous model
In many settings it is not enough to focus on a finite action or state space, but assume that both
of them are continuous. For example at wage negotiations or any discussions concerning prices,
we have to deal with a continuous interval. In this section we do not limit our attention any
more to the discrete setting, but switch to a continuous model. So in general we can assume
that A = Ω = [0, 1]. We state different conditions under which there is no possibility for a
fully revealing equilibrium. Afterwards we use the example of the quadratic loss function to
visualize our results. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, which give the conditions for fully revealing
equilibria with only a single message type, still hold. The conditions in these theorems still have
to hold for every state, which is more strict in the continuous model. The following Theorems 6
to 8 give us necessary conditions for the existence of different fully revealing equilibria, where
the continuity of uS and a∗R are the most important factors. Combined with the results from the
discrete model we also get the sufficient conditions.
Theorem 6 (Full Revelation under continuous uS and a∗R).
Assume that a∗R(ω) : Ω → A is continuous and that uS(a, ω) : A × Ω → R is continuous
in both arguments. Then full revelation can only be achieved either by cheap-talk messages in
every state or by verifiable messages only.
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Theorem 7 (Full Revelation under continuous uS(a, ω)).
Assume that uS(a, ω) is continuous. There can be a fully revealing equilibrium with both
message types used if there exists [ω, ω] ⊆ [0, 1] such that for all ω ∈ [0, 1]
1) lim
ωրω
a∗R(ω) 6= a
∗
R(ω)
2) lim
ωցω
a∗R(ω) 6= a
∗
R(ω)
3) If ω 6= ω : ∀ωi ∈ [ω, ω] : uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi) ∀ωj ∈ [ω, ω], ωj 6= ωi
holds.
Remarks.
• If ω = 0, then the first condition is always satisfied.
• If ω = 1, then the second condition is always satisfied.
• There may exist more than one interval satisfying the conditions of Theorem 7.
Theorem 7 states that if uS is continuous in both arguments, the function a∗R has to be dis-
continuous. The interval [ω, ω] gives the interval of states in which the Receiver believes the
Sender’s cheap-talk message. For that a∗R has to be neither right-continuous nor left-continuous
at a single ωˆ or not right-continuous at ω and not left-continuous at ω > ω. In the second case
the Sender also is not allowed to have any incentive to deviate to a different cheap-talk message
for states in [ω, ω].
Corollary 3.
There is a fully revealing equilibrium with both message types used if there exists [ω, ω] ⊆ [0, 1]
such that:
• [ω, ω] satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.
• Theorem 3 is satisfied with Ωˆ = [ω, ω].
Figure 1 shows three different discontinuous functions a∗R(ω). For the blue graph there can
be a fully revealing equilibriumwith both message types, where the threat point is at a∗R(
1
2
). The
red graph shows a situation where the possible threat point is at the border of the interval, here
at a∗R(1). So Condition 2) of Theorem 7 is always satisfied. As the function is discontinuous
for ω = 1, Condition 1) also holds. An example where Theorem 7 implies that there can be no
full revelation is given by the green graph. The function is continuous coming from below and
so does not satisfy Condition 1).
If a∗R is continuous the previous Theorem does not hold, but we need that uS is discontinuous
to achieve full revelation under the usage of both message types.
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Figure 1: Different examples for a∗R(ω).
Theorem 8 (Full Revelation under continuous a∗R(ω)).
Assume that a∗R(ω) is continuous. Only if uS(a, ω) is not continuous in at least one argument,
there can only be a fully revealing equilibrium with both message types used.
Remark. Theorems 7 and 8 just state necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the different
types of fully revealing equilibria.
3.1 Quadratic loss function
For this second part we like to focus on the quadratic loss utility for the Receiver and a biased
quadratic loss utility for the Sender. We show how our general results from the continuous
model work and what the intuition behind the missing of the fully revealing equilibria is. The
utility functions are uR = −(a − ω)2 and uS = −(a − ω − b(ω))2, where b(ω) ∈ R is the
state dependent bias function of the Sender. We assume that this bias function is continuous.
For positive values of b, the Sender wants to have a higher action than state, while for negative
values she wants to have a lower action than state. This is similar to the example Crawford and
Sobel (1982) use, but we allow that the bias function is state-dependent.
Clearly we have the problem that a∗R(ω) and uS(a, ω) are continuous and therefore all fully
revealing equilibria just include the use of one message type. As for A = Ω = [0, 1] the
function a∗R(ω) is bijective and so every action is the best reply for one state, we can focus on
pure strategies. It will happen that we misuse notation a little and denote actions by ω as well.
Then we simply mean the action a = ω.
As an immediate conclusion from Theorem 6 we see that there can be no fully revealing
equilibrium with both message types used. As long as the bias function b(ω) is not constant
equal to 0, the Sender will not always tell the truth by cheap-talk. In addition it is also impossible
to have a fully revealing equilibriumwhere the Sender just uses the verifiable messages, because
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every possible threat point aˆ is the Receiver’s best reply to one state. This means that in that
state the Receiver will never use the verifiable message, but prefers to save the costs and goes
for cheap-talk.
Corollary 4.
For A = Ω = [0, 1] and quadratic loss utility functions for the players, there are no fully
revealing equilibria.
This follows immediately from the continuity of uS and a∗R and Theorem 6. We can see it in
more detail with the help of the following Lemma:
Lemma 1.
There is a fully revealing equilibrium if
∃ωˆ : 1) ∀ω > ωˆ : b(ω) >
ωˆ − ω
2
−
c
2(ωˆ − ω)
2) ∀ω < ωˆ : b(ω) <
ωˆ − ω
2
−
c
2(ωˆ − ω)
Lemma 1 states the condition for a fully revealing equilibrium, where the Sender uses a
cheap-talk message in ωˆ and the verified messages in all other states. We can state the same
result for a set of states with cheap-talk messages, but use this case to illustrate the problem of
the continuous model.
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Figure 2: Regions of fully revealing equilibria, for ωˆ = 0, 0.5 and 1 with c = 0.4
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Figure 2 shows Lemma 1 for three different values of ωˆ. For ωˆ = 0, the function b(ω) has
to above the blue curve (in the blue area). If the Receiver answers every cheap-talk message by
the action ωˆ = 0, the Sender should not prefer this action over the one responding to the true
state. This can be achieved by a positive bias function, or for some values also by a slightly
negative one. For ωˆ = 1, the function b(ω) has to be below the red curve (in the red area). For
ωˆ = 0.5, the function b(ω) has to be below the green curve for ω < 0.5 and above for ω > 0.5
(in the green shaded area).
This figure already reveals a problem with this setting: No matter the value of ωˆ, it is neces-
sary that the bias function b(ω) gets either really high or low values. The problem here is that
the bias function has values in the real numbers, but Conditions 1) or 2) require |b(ω)| =∞, for
some ω. This means if the Receiver answers every cheap-talk message with ωˆ there is always a
neighborhood around ωˆ where the Sender prefers sending the costless cheap-talk message over
sending the costly verifiable message. The Sender’s utility loss by the quadratic loss function
(difference between action and state) is less than the utility loss resulting from the costs c.
3.1.1 Discretization
One way to achieve full revelation, while keeping the quadratic loss functions, is to discretize
the type space.
0
1
2
3
4
−1
−2
−3
−4
−5
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
ω
b(ω)
Figure 3: Regions of fully revealing equilibria, for ωˆ = 0, 0.5 and 1 with c = 0.4
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Figure 3 shows a discretization for example for Ω = {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}. There can be a fully
revealing equilibria, even with costly verification, quadratic loss functions and a continuous
action space. Again for ωˆ = 0, the function b(ω) has to above the blue curve (in the blue
area) for ω ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}. As we do not need this condition for values close to ωˆ, but
just starting with 0.1 the area is cut off at 0.1. This avoids that the bias function needs too
high values. Analogue for ωˆ = 1, the area is cut off at ω = 0.9 and the function b(ω) has
to be below the red curve (in the red area) for ω ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9}. There are two cuts for
ωˆ = 0.5. One at the state lower than 0.5, which is 0.4 and the other one at the next higher state,
0.6. The function b(ω) has to be below the green curve for ω ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.4} and above for
ω ∈ {0.6, 0.7, . . . , 1}(in the green shaded area).
Lemma 2.
Assume that the Sender’s utility is modeled by a quadratic loss function
uS(a, ω) = −(a− ω − b(ω))
2. If b(ω) is non-decreasing, uS satisfies increasing differences.
The application of Proposition 1 and the following corollaries can be seen in Figure 3 as well.
For aˆ = 0 and b(ω) increasing we have as first condition that b(ω) should be above the blue
curve. An example is given by the dashed blue curve. The maximal cost c have to be lower than
the utility difference is 0.1, which is illustrated as the difference between the blue curve and the
dashed blue curve. Similar for aˆ = 1 and the red dashed curve, here the critical condition is that
b(ω) stays below the red curve even for ω = 0.9.
4 Extensions
In this section we want to give some ideas of extension possibilities to fit our model into different
situations. We do not go much into detail, but just state our ideas and possible implications.
State dependent costs
One simple extension of our model is to allow that the costs for the verifiable message c are
state dependent, i.e. c(ω) : Ω→ R. As long as the costs are strictly positive for all states, there
are no mayor changes. Of course all conditions of the previous results are slightly different for
each state, but the ideas stay the same. A more dramatic change would happen if we allow that
the costs c are equal to zero for some states. Then there is no possibility to guarantee that there
exists a fully revealing equilibrium, where the Sender uses just cheap-talk. The simple reason
is that, in the states where the verifiable message is for free, she is indifferent as both messages
yield to the same utility. So Theorem 1 does not hold any longer.
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The most dramatic changes happen to our results in the continuous model: Even with contin-
uous utility uS and continuous a∗R, there can be a fully revealing equilibrium if c(ω) = 0 holds
for some ω. This might be an interesting point for future research.
Sender mixing
As long as there is full revelation, the Sender will never mix messages, so the only part where the
mixing plays a role is for the cases of partial revelation. Only under special circumstances the
Sender has an incentive to mix, for example if she is indifferent between several actions resulting
from different messages. If the Sender does not mix, the Receiver will use the probabilities of
each state to maximize his utility, as stated in section 2.2. Knowing that the Sender might mix
his actions, the Receiver will use Bayes’ rule to update his beliefs and maximize according to
them. This means we have to replace the probabilitiesP in the maximization problems with the
Receiver’s beliefs µ. We state three examples for this:
Example 5.
Assume that Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωl} and for simplicity P[ωi] =
1
L
∀ωi ∈ Ω. Furthermore we assume
that the Sender sends m1 in ω1 and ω2, but nowhere else. After reading the message m1 the
Receiver updates his beliefs to 1
2
ω1,
1
2
ω2.
Example 6.
Assume that Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωl}, P[ωi] =
1
L
∀ωi ∈ Ω and that the Sender mixes such that:
ω1 →
1
3
m1 +
2
3
m2
ω2 →
1
2
m1 +
1
2
m2
In all other states she does not send m1 or m2. Then if the Receiver gets the message m1, he
beliefs that the true state is: ω1 with probability
1/3
1/3+1/2
= 2
5
and ω2 with probability
1/2
1/3+1/2
=
3
5
. Analogue for messagem2.
Example 7.
Assume that Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωl}, P[ωi] =
1
L
∀ωi ∈ Ω and that the Sender mixes as follows:
ω1 →
1
3
m1 +
2
3
m2
ω2 →
1
2
m2 +
1
2
m3
ω3 → m3
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Then the Receivers beliefs are:
m1 → ω1
m2 →
2
5
ω1
3
5
ω2
m3 →
1
3
ω2
2
3
ω3
States as Sender’s types
Many economic examples do not consider different states of the world, but different Sender
types. We can easily see our states as types. For the typical notation we replace Ω by Θ with
elements θ1 to θL instead of ω1, . . . , ωL.
A standard example is to see the Sender as an agent looking for a job, with skills θ, while the
Receiver is the employer who wants to hire a well skilled worker. He can either choose to hire
the Sender or not. Of course his action depends on his belief of the Sender’s skills. The Sender
either just mentions her skill sets, which is the cheap-talk message, or she can verify it by some
certificates. If we assume that the Sender’s utility just depends on his employment and not on
his skills, the Receivers threat point here is not to hire the Sender after a cheap-talk message,
but just if the verifiable message shows that the Sender has the necessary skill level.
Receiver’s utility
To avoid multiple equilibria and the waste of money for verifiable messages when they are not
necessary, we can modify the utility function of the Receiver: uˆR(a, ω, u˜S) = uR(a, ω)+ǫR · u˜S ,
with uR and u˜S as before and ǫR > 0, but small. We assume ǫ to be such small that
|ǫR| ·max
ax
uˆS(ax, m, ω) < |uR(ai, ω)− uR(aj , ω)| ∀ω ∀ai, aj, i 6= j ∀m ∈M ∪ {v}. (2)
Equation (2) implies that the Receiver aims to maximize his utility directly by uR. He will not
choose an action that gives him not the highest uR, but a high utility through u˜S. With this
assumption we assure that the solutions of our maximization problems stay the same, but if
there are multiple solutions, the Receiver will choose the solution giving the highest utility to
the Sender. Especially for the case, where the preferences of the Sender and Receiver are the
same, this is helpful. In this setting there can be several fully revealing equilibria, but just the
one where the Receiver beliefs every cheap-talk message is Pareto-efficient.
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Sender’s utility
In the previous sections we ignored the possibility that the Sender might be indifferent between
sending a cheap-talk message or the verifiable message. We can change the utility function to
uˆS(a, ω,m, uR) = u˜S(a, ω,m) + ǫS · uR with u˜S and uR as before. Under some assumptions it
is reasonable that the Sender prefers cheap-talk, under other assumptions she should prefer the
verifiable messages. The best reason for cheap-talk is the one stated in the previous extension:
The Sender wants to maximize his utility, but at the same time she prefers a higher utility for
the Receiver over a lower one, in that case ǫS should be positive. On the other hand one can
argue that sending a verifiable message gives her certainty, what she might prefer. Then ǫS
should be negative. In both cases |ǫS| should be small enough not to interfere with the Sender’s
maximization problem, as we stated in equation (2) for the Receiver.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have combined the cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) with the
models dealing with verifiable messages. In our Sender-Receiver game the informed Sender
can choose between verifiable and non-verifiable messages. While the Receiver only learns
the true state for sure after reading a verifiable message, a cheap-talk message will not reveal
the true state to him, but just let him update his belief system. We stated conditions for a
discrete setting under which the Sender reveals the true state to the Receiver. The main idea
behind is known from other models as well: The Receiver punishes the Sender for not using the
verifiable message by answering every cheap-talk message with an action the Sender dislikes.
As we limit our attention to non-dominated action, there always exists a belief system which
makes this action best reply and so it makes the threat credible.
If such action does not exist, full revelation can only be achieved by common interests. In
that case the Sender has no reason to lie and the Receiver can trust every cheap-talk message.
Otherwise there can be only partial revelation or no revelation at all. In the first case we differ
between different ways of revelation, for each of them we state conditions. We have not only
analyzed different examples for partial revelation and have shown that there exist several ways
for the Receiver to maximize his utility, but also stated general results. For the case that the
utility functions have increasing or decreasing differences, all conditions simplify and make
them easier to check.
In a continuous model the enforcement of full revelation is more difficult. Under continuous
utility functions for the Sender and the Receiver there is no full revelation possible. We have
illustrated that at the standard example of the quadratic loss function and also have shown a
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way to counteract it: By discretization of the state space. All in all we stated results that allow
to check whether there are fully revealing equilibria or not. Therefore we differ between three
different types of fully revealing equilibria: The one where both message types are used and
those where the Sender always sticks to one kind of message.
For future research it might be interesting to make more than one verifiable message avail-
able. Letting the Sender send intervals of states, in which the true state has to be included,
might change our results. By that we could combine the cheap-talk literature and the verifiable
information literature even further. We also like to characterize the group of utility functions
further, which allow for full revelation, either by using specific properties as single-crossing
or by discretization of specific utility functions. There are several ways in which we can push
these ideas, but with this model we created a suitable foundation.
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Appendix
Proof. Theorem 1
Only if: Clearly there is a fully revealing equilibrium just with cheap-talk messages if Condition
(1) holds: The Receiver will trust every cheap-talk message and the Sender has no incentive to
deviate.
If: Proof by contradiction. Let us assume that ∃ωk such that uS(a∗R(ωk), ωk) 6> uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωk) ∀ωj 6=
ωk. This implies that there exists ωj such that uS(a∗R(ωk), ωk) < uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωk) holds. Then
the Receiver has an incentive to lie in ωk and send the cheap-talk message ωj , so there is no full
revelation.
Proof. Theorem 2
Only if: Follows directly.
If: Proof by contradiction.
Step 1) Let us assume that Condition 2) does not hold. Then there exists a ωj such that
uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωj)−c < uS(aˆ, ωj) holds. This implies that the Sender prefers sending a cheap-talk
message and getting action aˆ over sending the verifiable message and action a∗R(ωj). So she will
deviate in ωj and there will be no full revelation.
Step 2) Let us assume that Condition 1) does not hold, then Condition 2) does not hold and we
can follow Step 1).
Proof. Theorem 3
Only if: The equilibrium is as follows: For ω ∈ Ωˆ the Receiver trusts the cheap-talk and in all
other states the Sender uses the verifiable message.
If: Proof by contradiction.
Step 1) Let us assume that Condition 1) does not hold. This implies that there exist ωi 6∈ Ωˆ and
ωj ∈ Ωˆ such that uS(a∗R(ωj), ωi) > uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− c holds. So the Sender prefers cheap-talk
(and action a∗R(ωj)) over the verifiable message (and action a
∗
R(ωi)) and there will be no full
revelation, because a∗R(ωi) 6= a
∗
R(ωj).
Step 2)We assume that Condition 2) does not hold and follow the same steps as in the proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof. Proposition 1
We split the proof in two parts. First we show that for states higher than ωj , the Sender prefers
the verifiable message, then we do the same for lower states. Assume ωi > ωj holds. For
ωi = ωj+1 we have condition 2.1), which states that the Sender prefers the costly verifiable
message (yielding a∗R(ωj+1)), over the cheap-talk message (yielding aˆ).
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It remains to show that for all ωi > ωj+1 : c < uS(a∗R(ωi), ωi)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj , ωi) hold.
uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− uS(a
∗
R(ω1), ωi)
3.1)
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi)
1.)
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi−1)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi−1)
We repeat these two steps until
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωj+1), ωj+1)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωj+1)
2.1)
> c
Analogue steps yield the proof for ωi < ωj .
Proof. Proposition 2
The proof follows the same ideas as the proof of Proposition 1. The only difference is that we
go step by step from the boundary states and actions to the threat point, while in the previous
proof we moved from the threat point towards the boundaries.
For example for ωi > ωj:
uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi)
3.1)
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi+1), ωi)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi)
1.)
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi+1), ωi+1)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωi+1)
We repeat these two steps until
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωL), ωL)− uS(a
∗
R(ωj), ωL)
2.1)
> c
Proof. Proposition 3
If Condition 1) holds, the Sender has an incentive to use the verifiable message in all states in
ΩvI . She also sends the cheap-talk message in all other states, because of Condition 2). For
the Receiver aˆ is by definition an action that maximizes his expected utility on Ω \ ΩvI . As the
states in ΩvI are revealed, he will play the action he likes the most there. So both players have
no incentive to deviate and we have a partial revealing equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition 4
Analogue to the proof of Proposition 3.
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Proof. Proposition 5
Condition 1) ensures that Ω is split up in disjoint subsets. If Condition 2) holds, there is at
least one action aˆ for each subset that maximizes the Receiver’s expected utility that is such
that the Sender does not want to deviate to another action. This means that no player wants to
deviate.
Proof. Theorem 4
The first condition is necessary to have disjoint sets for partial revelation by cheap-talk and
verifiable messages. The action aˆ that satisfies condition 2) maximizes the Receiver’s utility on
the remaining states and by definition of ΩvI enforces the Sender to use the verifiable message
in the states in ΩvI . In the states in Ωct the Sender has no incentive to deviate to another cheap-
talk message by the definition of ΩvI .
Proof. Theorem 5
Conditions 1) and 2) make sure that Ω is completely split up into disjoint subsets. In each
subset Ωdivj the Sender sends a different cheap-talk message, so that the Receiver knows in
which subset he is. The Receiver maximizes his expected utility in each of these subsets by
aˆj . If Condition 4) holds, the Sender sends a verifiable message in all states in ΩvI and has no
incentive to deviate to any aˆj .
Proof. Proposition 6
By Condition 4) the Sender prefers sending cheap-talk over sending a verifiable message outside
the interval [ω, ω]. Therefore it is correct that aˆ is maximizing the Receiver’s utility outside that
interval.
Condition 1) ensures that for ω the Sender sends the verifiable message. It remains to show
that she does so for the rest of the interval as well. For ωi ∈ [ω, ω] we need uS(a∗R(ωi), ωi) −
uS(aˆ, ωi) > c. As in the proof of Proposition 1 we show that uS(a∗R(ωi), ωi) − uS(aˆ, ωi) >
uS(a
∗
R(ω), ω) − uS(aˆ, ω). By the first condition the result then follows. Starting from the left
side:
uS(a
∗
R(ωi), ωi)− uS(aˆ, ωi)
3)
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi)− uS(aˆ, ωi)
1)
≥ uS(a
∗
R(ωi−1), ωi−1)− uS(aˆ, ωi−1)
Repeating these steps until we reach ω yields the result.
We can use the increasing difference property, because by assumption a∗R(ω) > aˆ holds.
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Proof. Proposition 7
The proof follows the same steps as the previous one, but it might help to rewrite the definition
of increasing differences: ∀a′ ≥ a, ω′ ≥ ω :
uS(a
′, ω′)− uS(a, ω
′) ≥ uS(a
′, ω)− uS(a, ω)
⇔ uS(a, ω)− uS(a
′, ω) ≥ uS(a, ω
′)− uS(a
′, ω′)
Compared to the proof of the previous proposition, this time the steps go up from ωi to ω, using
aˆ > a∗R(ω).
Proof. Theorem 6
The possible existence of fully revealing equilibria with just one type of message sent follows
from the conditions imposed in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Assume that the Sender sends a
cheap-talk message just in wˆ and uses the verifiable message in all other states. The argumen-
tation for sending cheap-talk in several states or intervals will be the same. The Sender has an
incentive to use the verifiable message if uS(a∗R(ω), ω)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωˆ), ω). So for the states
close to ωˆ we get:
uS(a
∗
R(ωˆ ± ǫ), ωˆ ± ǫ)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωˆ), ωˆ ± ǫ) (3)
For ǫ→ 0 and the continuity of uS and a∗R this is equivalent to:
uS(a
∗
R(ωˆ), ωˆ)− c > uS(a
∗
R(ωˆ), ωˆ)
This then leads to c < 0, which is clearly a contradiction. So under this assumptions it is
not possible that there is a fully revealing equilibrium where the Sender uses both message
types.
Proof. Theorem 7
Assume that 1) or 2) do not hold, the problem is the same as described in equation (3), which
requires negative costs c.
Let us assume that 3) does not hold, then the Sender deviates when the real state is in the interval
[ω, ω] and so there cannot be full revelation.
Proof. Theorem 8
The proof is analogue to the proof of Theorem 7, using the discontinuity of uS instead of a∗R.
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Proof. Lemma 1
Assume that the Receiver answers every cheap-talk message with ωˆ.
The utility of the Sender for any state ω is given by:
uS("verifiable message") = −(−b(ω))2 − c
uS("cheap-talk message") = −(ωˆ − ω − b(ω))2 = − [(ωˆ − ω)2 − 2(ωˆ − ω) · b(ω) + (b(ω))2]
So the Sender will use the verifiable message if and only if:
−(−b(ω))2 − c > − [(ωˆ)− ω)2 − 2(ωˆ − ω) · b(ω) + (b(ω))2]
⇔ −2b(ωˆ − ω) > −(ωˆ − ω)2 + c
Case 1: ω > ωˆ
⇔ −2b < −(ωˆ − ω) + c
ωˆ−ω
⇔ b > ωˆ−ω
2
− c
2(ωˆ−ω)
Case 2: ωˆ > ω
⇔ −2b > −(ωˆ − ω) + c
ωˆ−ω
⇔ b < ωˆ−ω
2
− c
2(ωˆ−ω)
Proof. Lemma 2
Increasing Differences mean that the following condition have to hold ∀a′ ≥ a, ω′ ≥ ω:
uS(a
′, ω′)− uS(a, ω
′) ≥ uS(a
′, ω)− uS(a, ω)
⇔ −(a′ − ω′ − b(ω′))2 + (a− ω′ − b(ω′))2 ≥ −(a′ − ω − b(ω))2 + (a− ω − b(ω))2
⇔ a2 − (a′)2 + 2(b(ω′) + ω′)(a′ − a) ≥ a2 − (a′)2 + 2(b(ω) + ω)(a′ − a)
⇔ b(ω′) + ω′ ≥ b(ω) + ω
This condition is clearly satisfied if b(ω) is increasing, because ω′ ≥ ω holds.
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